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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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# TRENDS

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S U P P L E M E N T

THE FIFTH NORTH KOREAN PARTY CONGRESS: STRESS ON INDEPENDENCE

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## THE FIFTH NORTH KOREAN PARTY CONGRESS: STRESS ON INDEPENDENCE

### INTRODUCTION

The Fifth Congress of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP), held from 2 to 13 November 1970, was the first since September 1961 although the party constitution stipulates that congresses are to be held every four years. A party "conference" was held in October 1966.\* According to one line of speculation at the time, Pyongyang resorted to the device of calling a "conference" in lieu of a congress in order to avoid the complications in the communist movement that inviting foreign delegations might have caused, particularly at a time of deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations. But the Sino-Soviet dispute is now in a relatively quiescent phase, and foreign delegations were still not invited to the recent congress, at which Pyongyang again made clear the paramount value it attaches to autonomy in the communist movement.

The convocation of the congress had originally been announced for October 1970 at a KWP Central Committee plenum in December 1969. The postponement until November may have been due to dissensions within the party as well as to administrative or economic difficulties. The congress enacted changes in the top leadership of the party which resulted in a narrowing of membership of the ruling organs. Half of the 10 members of the Political Committee were dropped, being replaced largely by former candidate members, and the ranks of the candidate members were reduced from 13 to four. Members with close personal ties with Kim Il-song, including two members of his family, were among those elevated to full membership.

The KWP Central Committee's report to the congress, delivered by Kim Il-song, reflected the past year's improvement of relations with the PRC and stressed Pyongyang's call for an Asian "united front" directed against the United States and Japan. On ideological issues, the report reaffirmed the KWP's independent stance and expressed confidence that the party had been cleansed of alien influences. At the same time, it included a hardline attack on "revisionism" reminiscent of the affinities with

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\* See FBIS Radio Propaganda Report CD. 271 of 18 November 1966, "North Korean Policy Lines Formalized at Party Conference and Plenum."

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Peking's position shown by Pyongyang before the vagaries of the Chinese cultural revolution soured Sino-Korean relations. A greetings message to the congress from the CCP Central Committee, paying warm tribute to Kim Il-song personally, was read at the opening session; the message from the CPSU Central Committee, couched in less effusive language and containing no mention of Kim by name, was not read until the third day of the congress--after a number of greetings from other communist countries and third-world groups.

Regarding economic matters, Kim's report conceded that heavy defense burdens had impeded economic development, and it cautioned against hopes for a significant improvement in living standards. While expressing satisfaction with the achievement of goals in the defense buildup, Kim pressed the line on developing unconventional warfare capabilities, avoiding dependence on foreign military aid, and not trying to compete with developed countries in advanced military weaponry and equipment.

In line with the apparent economic and military retrenchment, the report's discussion of the South Korean "struggle" and unification seemed to indicate a lower North Korean profile. It stressed that the South Koreans must take the responsibility for their own revolution, played down the North Korean role, and suggested no particular haste in achieving unification of the country.

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## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: CALL FOR ASIAN UNITED FRONT

The discussion of international affairs in Kim's report reflects the past year's improvement of relations with the PRC based on a community of interests among the Asian communist countries that implicitly excludes or plays down the role of the Soviets. Pointing out that Asia has become the "main arena of the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle today," Kim delivered a standard indictment of the United States for intervening in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, for persisting in provocation against Korea, and for continuing to "occupy" Taiwan while "incessantly stepping up their aggressive acts against the Chinese people." He also delivered a standard warning, with anti-Soviet overtones of opposition to detente politics, that "there can be neither vacillation nor passivity" in the struggle against the United States.

Stressing the theme of Asian solidarity, the report repeated Pyongyang's insistent call in recent months for the peoples of Korea, China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia "and all other revolutionary countries in Asia" to develop "the anti-U.S. united front." The formulation, introduced by Kim at a 15 June banquet for the visiting Prince Sihanouk, has been a prominent peg for Pyongyang's efforts to associate its interests with those of Peking and the Indochinese communists. The theme figured prominently in statements by both the Chinese and the Koreans on the 20th anniversary in June of the outbreak of the Korean War. It also appeared in Korean comment on the 25 October anniversary of the Chinese entry into the Korean War; however, it was not echoed on that occasion by the Chinese, who were by then exhibiting caution in spelling out their commitment to the North Korean cause and in treating issues of mutual security.\* The Koreans have sought to play up themes linking the two countries' vital interests and portraying a common U.S. threat to the security of the DPRK and the PRC, as exemplified by charges in Kim's congress report that the United States is committing aggression against the Chinese while conducting provocations against Korea.

In the report Kim addressed himself at length to the dangers of "revived Japanese militarism," thus stressing another major element in the propaganda campaign for Asian revolutionary

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\* See the FBIS TRENDS of 28 October 1970, pages 25-29.

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unity. In so doing he again expressed Pyongyang's misgivings over Soviet dealings with Japan, warning that "one must not harbor any illusion in the Japanese ruling circles or pin any hope on them." He further warned that "if one refuses to see the aggressive nature of Japanese militarism and fight against it and eulogizes Japan's reactionary government or gets on intimate terms with it," the result will be to increase the danger of war in Asia and consolidate the U.S. position there. Like the Chinese, the North Koreans have expressed concern lest Japan play an increasingly important role as a stabilizing force in Asia that will serve U.S. interests and frustrate vital Pyongyang and Peking objectives.

**GREETINGS**      The treatment of CCP and CPSU greetings to the congress  
**MESSAGES**      and to Kim on his reelection as General Secretary also reflects the current state of Pyongyang's relations with its big communist neighbors. The message from the CCP Central Committee, dated 1 November and carried by NCNA on the 2d, warmly greeted the congress, noting that the KWP, "founded personally by Comrade Kim Il-song, the great leader of the Korean people," guides the Korean people to victory in their revolution. It expressed "support" for the Koreans' struggle against "U.S. imperialism, Japanese militarism, and the reactionary Pak Chong-hui clique" in defense of the fatherland's independence and for "peaceful unification."\*

The CPSU Central Committee message, dated 2 November, was summarized by TASS that day and carried in full in PRAVDA on the 3d. Couched in somewhat cooler language than the Chinese message, it failed to mention Kim by name, merely noting that the congress was summing up the results of work carried out by the people of the DPRK "under the leadership of the KWP and its Central Committee."\*\* The message

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\* On the 25 October anniversary of the Chinese entry into the Korean War, Peking propaganda repeatedly called for "peaceful unification" of Korea, using the characterization "peaceful" for the first time since 1966. This change seems to accord with the recent caution shown by Peking in defining its commitments to Pyongyang.

\*\* Soviet leaders' messages to the DPRK on state occasions, such as the 9 September national day and the 15 August liberation anniversary, customarily do not name Kim when referring to the KWP's leadership of the Korean people. But the CPSU Central Committee message on the 25th anniversary of the KWP, published in PRAVDA on 10 October, named him as the head of the KWP and warmly praised the party for attaining a "high level of authority as the militant vanguard of the Korean people and as the organizer of all their victories."

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followed routine lines in expressing solidarity with the Korean people's struggle for the withdrawal of U.S. forces and in wishing them success in the "peaceful reunification" of the country. The message added a standard call for "unity and cohesion" of the socialist countries and the international communist movement.

The Koreans read the Chinese message first at the opening session of the Congress on 2 November; the one from the Soviets was not read until the session of the 4th, after a number of greetings from other communist countries and various third-world groups. A 4 November KCNA report of a number of greetings received from communist countries listed the Soviet message second, after the one from the Chinese.

The Soviets barely observed the amenities in congratulating Kim upon his reelection as KWP General Secretary at the conclusion of the congress. On 14 November NCNA reported that the CCP Central Committee sent a message to the KWP Central Committee and Kim Il-song extending congratulations on the election of the new Central Committee "headed by Comrade Kim Il-song, founder of the KWP and its great leader." KCNA reported the message the next day. On 19 November KCNA reported that on the 17th the Soviet ambassador called on Kim Tong-kyu, a new member of the party Political Committee, and "conveyed the warm congratulations" of Brezhnev to Kim Il-song upon his reelection. There is no indication that an actual message was delivered, and there is no available mention of the congratulations in Soviet media.

#### IDEOLOGY: KWP'S AUTONOMY REAFFIRMED, REVISIONISM ASSAILED

The report's discourse on ideological issues, while predictably stressing the importance of the KWP's autonomy within the communist movement, is notably different in emphasis from the corresponding section of Kim's report to the October 1966 party conference. The current treatment of ideological matters, expressing marked confidence that the party's independent line has been consolidated and cleansed of alien influences, suggests that the polemical disputes generated by the Sino-Soviet conflict no longer have the resonance they have had in the past in a party such as the KWP. Significantly, in his Fifth Congress report Kim simply ignored the role of "the socialist camp." In his report to the 1966 party conference, registering concern over the crisis of disunity in the socialist camp at a time of confrontation in Vietnam, he took the Chinese sharply to task for pressing their ideological contest with the Soviets rather than closing ranks behind the embattled Vietnamese brethren.

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In the congress report Kim acknowledged the "very difficult and complicated" conditions of the past in which "revisionist ideological trends" penetrated the party as a result of ideological confusion within the international communist movement. But he claimed that the KWP "thoroughly exposed and smashed" the revisionist elements and that "a great victory of historic significance" has been won by the party in raising its unity and cohesion to a new level. Coming down hard on the crucial importance of the "chuche" principle of autonomy within the communist movement, he declared that "flunkeyism, national nihilism, and dogmatism as ideological trends have been eliminated in the main among our party members and people."

In another passage Kim inveighed against revisionism in hardline terms long associated with Chinese criticism of Soviet policies and reminiscent of the period in the first half of the 1960's, when the North Koreans indicated their ideological affinities with the Chinese. He defined revisionism as

a trend of counterrevolutionary opportunist ideology aimed at emasculating the revolutionary quintessence of Marxism-Leninism. The greatest harm of revisionism lies in denying the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist party and the dictatorship of the proletariat and opposing the class struggle, in obscuring the line of demarcation between friend and foe, yielding to U.S. imperialism, scared at its policy of nuclear blackmail, casting sheep's eyes at the imperialists while paying lip-service to an anti-imperialist position, giving up the struggle against imperialism and compromising with it, disarming people ideologically by spreading war phobia, bourgeois pacifistic ideas and illusions about imperialism and reaction, and in abhorring and hindering the revolution of the oppressed peoples.

Kim's insistence here on a "line of demarcation" is somewhat ironic. In his October 1966 report he deplored the Chinese demand for a line of demarcation to exclude Soviet-leaning elements in the international communist movement and called for enhanced unity in the socialist camp despite ideological differences. At that time he was concerned to rebuke the Chinese for accenting the ideological conflict and laying

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claim to purity of doctrine. Kim had put a gloss on the standard formulation--dating from the 1960 Moscow statement--which termed revisionism the "main danger" in the communist movement while acknowledging that dogmatism could become the principal danger to an individual party at a particular stage of development. He declared that modern revisionism was "a big menace" but that "when 'left' opportunism is aggravated, it too can become as big a threat as modern revisionism both to individual parties and to the international communist movement."

The report's current discussion thus registers satisfaction over Peking's shift, particularly in the past year, away from an intransigent sectarianism to a search for a community of interests among small and medium powers in opposition to superpower dominance. It also reflects Peking's success in repairing its relations with Pyongyang by stressing common opposition to the United States and such allies as Japan which are regarded as hostile to the vital interests of the PRC and the DPRK. Kim's failure to find a place for the socialist camp in his discussion accords with Peking's rejection of this notion and points up the role of Asian "revolutionary" unity as the focus of the current North Korean line.\*

#### ECONOMY AND DEFENSE: MILITARY SPENDING SLOWED ECONOMY

Kim's report conceded that the defense burden has been a heavy one and has impeded economic development. He defended as "very wise" the decision made at the KWP conference in October 1966 to postpone for three years the completion of the seven-year plan in order to concentrate on the defense buildup. He also claimed that the DPRK has now become a "socialist-industrial state" which has "joined the ranks of the advanced countries of the world as a full-fledged member." Implying that there will now be a period of retrenchment and consolidation, the report defined the new six-year plan as designed "to further cement the material and technical foundations of socialism and free the working people from arduous labor in all fields of the national economy by consolidating and carrying forward the successes gained in industrialization and advancing the technical revolution onto a new, higher plane."

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\* It is noteworthy that the North Vietnamese, with their overriding concern to maintain neutrality in the Sino-Soviet conflict while enlisting support from both sides, continue to define their place in the socialist camp. Thus, Hanoi's 10 December party-government appeal for anti-U.S. struggle declared that the DRV is an independent and sovereign state and "a member of the socialist camp."

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Kim's report praised the implementation of the party's policy on fortifying the nation's defenses, stating that one of the "most significant" achievements is the fact that "the entire people have been placed under arms and the whole country fortified." It claimed that "the entire people know how to fire guns and are carrying arms with them. Further, we have built iron-wall defenses throughout the country and even fortified all the major production installations." It also stressed that the defense industry can now manufacture its own weapons and equipment, "as a result of the establishment of firm bases of an independent national defense industry." Thus, Kim claimed fulfillment of the goals--outlined in his October 1966 report to the KWP conference--for which the seven-year plan was postponed.

At the same time, the report pointed to the burdens that attainment of these goals imposed. Conceding that the defense buildup was gained "at a very large and dear price," it acknowledged that spending on national defense has been "too heavy a burden for us in the light of the small size of the country and its population." The efforts to augment defense power "greatly impeded the economic development of the country and the betterment of the people's living," Kim admitted. In another section of the report he cautioned that there would be a continuing need to give priority to defense preparations at the expense of living standards, saying that under conditions in which the United States still occupies half of the country and unification has not yet been achieved, "we can never live in luxury but must always lead a frugal life befitting the people in the era of revolution."

The report emphasized a need to improve unconventional warfare capability, calling for the KPA to make use of the topographical conditions of the country and employ mountain warfare, night actions, and guerrilla operations. It cited the experiences of the Korean War and Vietnam to justify these tactics. Stressing the line of self-reliance and warning against dependence on foreign aid, it said that modernization of the army and development of military science and technique must be based on "the specific conditions of our country" and that the defense program may be hindered "if we try instead to mechanically copy or dogmatically bring in foreign art of war and foreign weapons." Kim added that the DPRK, a small country, "is not in a position to compete with developed countries in military technical equipment, nor are we required to do so." War is not decided by "modern weapons or

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military technique," he said, and the KWP has "politico-ideological superiority" over the imperialists. In this context the report warned that "we must never be captivated by a pacifistic mood" and must guard against the "revisionist ideological trend to war phobia."

The report's emphasis on unconventional warfare and its warning against dependence on foreign military aid could have been designed as a rebuttal to advocates of military modernization and hence of greater allocations to the military or of greater reliance on a Soviet supply of advanced equipment. Policy differences on these issues may have caused purges among the military leadership, including replacement of the minister of defense and chief of staff, in late 1968. The report seemed to allude to this in recalling past tendencies in the army--which it claims have now been overcome--to deny the party's "leading role" and to neglect political work as well as toward "hampering proper military training and breeding military bureaucratism."\*

**CADRE PROBLEMS** In addition to claiming that improper tendencies within the military have been overcome, Kim's report registered satisfaction that the alien tendencies of "opportunism, flunkeyism, dogmatism, and factionalism" have all but been eliminated from the party. A less confident tone marked his October 1966 report's warnings against the "survivals of outdated ideas" and the continued existence of "a handful of hostile elements." Although in the congress report Kim strongly criticized the performance of some cadres, his complaints seemed directed at administrative--rather than ideological and political--shortcomings. He complained that some cadres "avoid their work, ignore advice,

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\* The report's strictures against relying on foreign aid and against emphasizing modern weaponry came against the background of a new Soviet-DPRK aid agreement, signed on 15 September, which was given minimal publicity by Pyongyang. That agreement did not specifically mention military aid. (See the FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT, "DPRK Aid Agreements With PRC and USSR," 26 October 1970.) In May 1965, a Soviet-DPRK military aid agreement was publicized, and in March 1967, when First Vice Premier Kim Il visited the Soviet Union, an agreement was announced which included cooperation on raising the DPRK's "defense potential."

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behave bureaucratically, and become arrogant," some of them being so corrupt that they "drop out of the ranks of the revolution." As a remedy, the report recommended a "tightening" of party discipline, improvement of criticism and training, and "correct selection" of cadres emphasizing their "political" and "business" qualifications.

North Korean leaders rarely discuss internal party difficulties so outspokenly, although they allude on occasion to insufficient revolutionary fervor among party members and working people. One relatively strong reference of this kind appeared in a 22 April 1968 report on economic construction by First Vice Premier Kim Il, delivered at a KWP plenum. Kim Il complained that implementation of the party's line on economic and defense building in parallel, put forth at the October 1966 party conference, had been hampered by "passivism and conservatism" among some party members and workers who feared innovation and clung to old ideas about norms, science, and technology.

#### UNIFICATION: STRESS ON SOUTH KOREAN POLITICAL STRUGGLE

North Korea's shift over the past two years away from terrorism against South Korea and toward political subversion there was confirmed in Kim's Fifth Congress report, which stressed that the South Korean people must take the responsibility for their own revolution. Kim did not call for any particular haste in attaining the "liberation" of South Korea or unification of the country; he conceded that the South Korean revolution "still has a thorny path ahead," and he made only bland, generalized promises of North Korean support for the southern struggle. The relative lack of bellicosity may be traceable to the domestic economic situation and the slowing of the defense buildup as well as the failures of the more militant tactics used in the 1966-68 period when Pyongyang intensified incidents along the demilitarized zone and stepped up guerrilla activity in South Korea.

**SOUTH KOREAN "STRUGGLE"**      The leading role in the South Korean "national liberation struggle and people's democratic revolution" was ascribed to the Revolutionary Party for Reunification, the vanguard "Marxist-Leninist party" said to have been formally established in August 1969. Kim had been calling for the formation of such a party since his

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speech at the Fourth KWP Congress in 1961, and in his Fifth Congress report he portrayed it as the culmination of long revolutionary development in South Korea, investing it with a more extensive history than past propaganda had done. He recalled the founding in December 1955 of the Progressive Party, a "legal political party of the South Korean revolutionaries" with a program of anti-imperialism, antifascism, and peaceful unification, which was suppressed in 1958. The uprising of April 1960 which overthrew Syngman Rhee, according to Kim, was "the first victory won by the South Korean people in their anti-U.S., national salvation struggle after the war," and it was followed by the founding of the Socialist Mass Party advocating "a unified democratic state based on the line of national independence." This party was destroyed, Kim said, after the 16 May 1961 coup which brought Pak Chong-hui to power.

In the report Kim reaffirmed a view of the historical experience of the South Korean revolutionary movement as proof that "there can be no peaceful transition in the struggle for power and that no revolution can be led to victory by a mere mass movement"-- a line he had used in a 1968 national day speech. He also repeated the stock formula that "counterrevolutionary violence" must be met with "revolutionary violence." Events, he said, showed the need for a vanguard "Marxist-Leninist party" and it was in response to this need that the manifesto and program of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification were made public in Seoul in August 1969.\*

Kim claimed that "organizations of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification" had taken an active part in the 3 June 1964 uprising against the ROK-Japan talks, the August 1965 struggle to reject the ROK-Japan agreements, the struggle against the "puppet" elections in 1967, and "many other struggles." Similar claims had been made for the "United Revolutionary Party," apparently a forerunner of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification. A 29 January 1969 KCNA commentary alleged that it took part in the 1967 struggles against the elections and against U.S. Vice President Humphrey when he visited Seoul for President Pak's inauguration.

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\* A speaker identified as the head of the delegation of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification, who addressed the 4 November session of the congress, repeated the claim that the party's "local bodies," as distinguished from the central committee, dated back to March 1964. The existence of the party was first publicized in North Korean media in June 1970 when Pyongyang carried its "program" and "manifesto." See the FBIS TRENDS of 24 June 1970, pages 11-12.

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**PEACEFUL UNIFICATION**      The report routinely restated North Korea's dedication to the notion of "peaceful unification," reiterating willingness to "negotiate" with "democratic personages with national conscience" if they come to power in South Korea. It again denounced the "so-called 'peaceful unification program'" of the South Korean "puppets"--an allusion to Pak Chong-hui's comments on unification in a liberation anniversary speech last August, which Pyongyang promptly rejected in editorial comment at the time. Kim's report reasserted that unification cannot be discussed with those "traitors" nor while U.S. forces remain in South Korea. In the report he reviewed the DPRK's proposals on unification, including the reduction of armies to 100,000 each, a nonaggression agreement, free North-South elections, an interim confederation, and the like.

**NORTH KOREAN ROLE IN ROK "STRUGGLE"**      The report played down the North Korean role in the South Korean "struggle," merely repeating bland, generalized expressions of support. It said that the South Korean people are "not alone," that they have a "powerful revolutionary base" in the northern half, and that the North Korean people have the "obligation and responsibility for actively supporting and encouraging" the South Korean people. But there was no expression of a determination to help "liberate" the South Koreans--a feature of propaganda in 1968 and earlier. Kim's report emphasized that "the South Korean revolution is a struggle of the South Korean people themselves for their liberation" and that the masses "can win freedom and emancipation only through their own revolutionary struggle. Therefore the South Korean revolution should, in all circumstances, be carried out by the South Korean people on their own initiative."

**TIMING OF UNIFICATION**      Commenting on the timing of unification, Kim's report did not go beyond the usual vague assertion that the solution of the problem "brooks not a moment's delay." It did not make the common assertion that unification must be completed "within our generation." Political Committee member Kim Chung-nin, however, speaking at the 5 November session, did say that the North and South Korean people "hope to make the 1970's a decade of glorious victory in which the independent unification of the fatherland will be achieved," the first reference to such a specific time period for unification on Pyongyang's own authority.\*

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\* On a few isolated occasions in late 1969 and early 1970 Pyongyang media attributed to South Korean spokesmen a desire for unification in time for Kim Il-song's 60th birthday, which falls in April 1972. See the TRENDS of 12 February 1970, pages 17-18.

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That the North Koreans do not in fact harbor ideas about imminent revolution in the South is indicated by Kim's remarks on the future tasks of the southern patriots, whom he urged to continue to strengthen the Marxist-Leninist party, rally the workers and peasants around it, and continue to set up "mass organizations in various forms." In this context Kim warned that the South Korean revolution "will not achieve victory easily" and "still has a thorny path ahead."

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